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I. INTRODUCTION
You are standing on the sidewalk, in front of a store, with a couple of friends.
As you stand there and talk, you look through the store window. While you
continue to talk, one of your friends looks through the window, too. At that
moment, a police officer approaches you, asks for your identification, and even
frisks your person if you happen to be wearing baggy clothing. This type of
situation is called an "investigative stop." If the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts which warrant the intrusion, then the stop is legal-at least since
Terry v. Ohio.'
Terry lowered the constitutional requirement of individualized suspicion for
limited searches or seizures from probable cause to reasonable suspicion. While
an officer must have "reasonably trustworthy information" to suspect that a
person has committed or is committing a crime to establish probable cause,3 a
police officer can form reasonable suspicion from mere "specific reasonable
inferences."' The difference is that under reasonable suspicion, police need less
justification to stop a person for investigative purposes.5 In the past, the Court
protected individual rights by requiring officers to have a more solid basis for
stopping a particular person,6 but Terry changed this by giving more deference to
the suspicions of individual officers.
In addition to lowering the standard of individualized suspicion, Terry also
dispensed with the historical warrant requirement approach to Fourth
Amendment analysis for limited searches." Rather than giving preference to the
individual's rights, Terry analyzed the investigative stop from the police officer's
point of view.9 In so doing, Terry ushered in a new era of police-perspective
rulings'° and departed from the protection-oriented jurisprudence of Katz v.
1. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
2. Id.; Jolene D. Pettus, Fourth Amendment-The Expansion of the Terry Doctrine to Completed
Felonies, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 986 (1985).
3. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) ("Probable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed." (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
4. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating that search is reasonable if the officer can point to "specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.").
5. Id. ("[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.").
6. See Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 669, 678-81 (1988) (explaining the more
individualistic approach used by the Court in Katz and its progeny of cases).
7. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
8. Id.; Maclin, supra note 6, at 678-81.
9. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Maclin, supra note 6, at 678-81 (discussing how Terry transformed the
Katz model of Fourth Amendment analysis).
10. Maclin, supra note 6, at 678.
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United States and similar cases.1" In short, Terry reduced the importance of
individual rights-both in the realm of Fourth Amendment analysis and in
everyday life."
The Supreme Court announced the Terry decision in 1968 in a case involving
a police officer's investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion that petitioner
was in the process of committing armed robbery, a felony." However, the
Supreme Court did not explicitly address what other types of crime would be
covered by the rule. Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Hensley, the
Court applied the Terry doctrine to stops investigating completed felonies.' 4 And
for more than twenty years after Hensley, courts have continually sought to
resolve the issue of whether the Terry standard should apply in situations not
contemplated by the Court in Terry, specifically in cases involving completed
misdemeanor offenses. 5 While four circuit courts and at least four state courts
have ruled on this question, they offer little consistency as to how, or if, Terry
should apply. 6
This Comment examines the possible approaches to this issue and suggests
that the Court extend the Terry "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard of
individualized suspicion only to those completed misdemeanors that implicate
public safety. This suggested rule is consistent with the balancing test enunciated
in Terry, while simultaneously affording proper Constitutional protections. This
Comment posits that such a rule protects both the state interests articulated in
Terry and the privacy interests of individuals embodied in the Fourth
Amendment. It would also limit the lowered standard of individualized suspicion
to only those cases in which a lower standard is absolutely necessary to protect
public safety, giving proper deference to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
Section II of this Comment analyzes the Terry decision and its aftermath.
Section III evaluates the arguments against extending the Terry standard to all
completed misdemeanors and explains why these approaches fall short of
protecting the government's interest in public safety. Section IV considers the
arguments for extending Terry to all completed misdemeanors and examines why
11. Id.at681.
12. Id.
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 30 ("[Wlhere a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.").
14. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d
1135 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007); Gaddis v. Redford Twp.,
364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jegede, 294 F. Supp. 2d 704 (D. Md. 2003); State v.
Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 701-03 (La. Ct. App.
1986); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 881, 883-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 515, 521 (Wash. 2002) (dealing with whether the Terry standard should be applied in
cases dealing with completed misdemeanors).
16. See supra note 15.
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these approaches are practically unworkable and fail to provide full protection for
individual rights. Section V suggests a mixed approach to the extension of Terry
and discusses possible ways of defining a "threat to public safety."
II. THE TERRY CASE
In Terry, the Court introduced a new standard of individualized suspicion
into the Fourth Amendment analysis for law enforcement investigations.'7 Where
previous cases required an officer to have probable cause to conduct a search or
seizure, Terry allowed police officers to engage in more limited stops and frisks
based only on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is "afoot" and that
"the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous."'
8
In the decades since Terry, the Court has extended the Terry analysis to
completed felonies, applying it in situations where crime may not necessarily be
"afoot."' 9
A. The End of Probable Cause for "Limited" Intrusions
In Terry v. Ohio, a detective on patrol in downtown Cleveland observed two
men in front of a store window on a street corner.20 The detective watched the
men pace back and forth in front of the store window approximately twelve
times, stopping to stare into the window and confer with one another after each
stroll.2' The detective's thirty-nine years of experience led him to believe that the
men were "casing a job, a stick-up" and that they may have been armed and
dangerous:" Accordingly, the detective stopped the men to investigate the
situation further. He asked the men for their names, ordered them into the store,
removed one man's overcoat, and patted down (or, in the Court's words,
"frisk[ed]") the men's outer clothing.3 Subsequently, the men were arrested for,
and convicted of, carrying concealed weapons. 24 On appeal, they challenged the
reasonableness of the officer's stop and frisk.2
The Supreme Court held that an officer "must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion," and as long as the officer could point to those
26facts, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Under the
17. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227-29.
20. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5-8.
24. Id. at 4-7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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Fourth Amendment analysis previously used by the Court, the detective in Terry
would have had to show probable cause, as well as a warrant or warrant
exception, to detain the individuals27 and search them for weapons. While this
standard still applies to full searches and seizures, Terry carved out an exception
for more limited intrusions, such as the stop of a car or the frisk of an
individual. 29 Thus, Terry changed the Fourth Amendment framework for limited
intrusions.30
Since Terry, "stops" and "frisks"-as opposed to arrests and full searches
and seizures-have been analyzed under the reasonableness clause, rather than
the warrant clause, of the Fourth Amendment." Under the warrant clause, a
search or seizure is constitutional only after a warrant is obtained through an
affidavit supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral, detached
magistrate. The judge must read that affidavit and agree that the police action is
justified before the police officer is allowed to search or seize persons or their
property.33 Before Terry, the reasonableness of police action was analyzed under
this clause-if there was a properly issued warrant or a valid warrant exception,
then the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Terry,
however, divorced the requirement of a warrant or warrant exception from the
goal of reasonableness and held that limited searches and seizures could be
reasonable under the Constitution, even without the previously required warrant
or warrant exception.3"
While not overruling the warrant clause analysis, the Court effectively
exempted "an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat"-from the
requirements of the warrant clause jurisprudence by saying that these situations
could not be subject to the warrant requirement as a "practical matter. '36 Rather,
the Court held that this type of police conduct must be analyzed under the
"Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
27. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and
Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 389 (1988) ("When the fourth amendment governed.., it provided the full
protections of the warrant clause .... ).
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." (emphasis in original)).
29. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
30. Id.; Maclin, supra note 6, at 678.
31. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 53 (1969); Pettus, supra note 2; Maclin, supra note 6.
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
33. See id. (emphasizing that searches conducted without prior judicial approval are per se unreasonable,
except in certain well-defined circumstances).
34. Id.
35. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.
36. Id. at 20.
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seizures."" In doing so, Terry lowered the level of individualized suspicion
required for a police officer to conduct a limited search or seizure of an
individual.38 Unlike the warrant clause, the "general reasonableness" analysis
does not require a written justification for the stop beforehand, nor does it require
judicial oversight or solid evidence before a search or seizure can be carried out.39
The Court justified dispensing with the warrant requirement and its exceptions by
focusing on the limited nature of the intrusion upon the individual. 4 Instead of
requiring a warrant supported by probable cause, the Court created a balancing
test to evaluate the reasonableness of the particular searches and seizures in the
case. 4' To determine whether the officer's actions were justified, the Court
balanced the government's interests against the interests of the person.4 2
The Court found several legitimate government interests justifying the
officer's intrusions, such as crime prevention and detection.4 '3 Noting that the
officer would have been derelict in his duties had he not stopped the men, the
Court held that the officer's initial investigation of the situation furthered the
legitimate government interests at hand," and it cited officer safety as a
justification for the frisk of the defendant. 5 Next, the Court considered the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the interests of the individual-or as the Court
termed it, "the sanctity of the person. 46 While acknowledging that even a brief
stop of a citizen is a serious intrusion "upon cherished personal security," the
Court held that the government interests of crime prevention, crime detection,
and officer safety outweighed the personal interests affected by the limited
intrusion.4 7 Accordingly, Terry declared a per se rule: when based on reasonable
suspicion, these limited intrusions are reasonable under the reasonableness clause
of the Fourth Amendment and are therefore Constitutional.48
In shifting the Fourth Amendment analysis for limited searches and seizures
from the warrant clause framework to the reasonableness clause framework, "the
Terry decision transformed Katz' [s] individualistic, protection-oriented analysis
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 20-21 (asserting that rather than having an officer go through the entire process of
obtaining a warrant based on probable cause, an officer could justify a limited search or seizure based on a mere
reasonable articulable suspicion).
40. Id. at 24-27.
41. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.
42. Id. at21.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 22-23 ("It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when
he decided to approach the petitioner and his companions... It would have been poor police work indeed for an
officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed
to investigate this behavior further.").
45. Id. at 23-24.
46. Id. at 17, 24-25.
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 25-27.
48. Id. at 30.
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into an ad hoc balancing test." 49 Effectively, "Terry ushered in a 'new regime"'
of Fourth Amendment analysis, wherein the government's interests are given
preference over the interests of the individual 0 Because the government interests
outweigh the individual's rights, the intrusion is justified and is therefore
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' In the decades since Terry, courts
have used the same reasonableness inquiry and balancing test to determine
whether the reasonable suspicion standard should apply in other circumstances. 2
Yet, even while announcing a per se rule declaring reasonable, articulable
suspicion as the new framework for these lesser searches and seizures, the Court
in Terry was cognizant of the potential for officer abuse resulting in unwarranted
intrusions upon individual rights.53  By analyzing intrusions under the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Court removed the
protections of a warrant supported by probable cause and the judicial oversight
that was necessary to obtain the warrant. Instead, it substituted reasonable
suspicion, a standard of individualized suspicion requiring less than probable
cause and no judicial oversight, while maintaining that this was sufficient Fourth
Amendment protection for such limited intrusions 5
Nonetheless, the Court made explicit that these limited intrusions were
allowable based on a reasonable suspicion only if they were in fact limited to
frisks, rather than full searches 6 The Court limited the officers' actions to those
that serve the purpose of the limited intrusion-the safety of officers and crime
prevention. 7 In doing so, it built a safeguard into the Terry rule-a limit on the
extent to which governmental interests can justify invasion of those individual
interests of privacy and autonomy.58
49. Id. at 20-22; Maclin, supra note 6, at 681.
50. Maclin, supra note 6, at 681 ("The only justification given by the Terry court for this fundamental
change in Katz reasoning was the assertion that '[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures,
but unreasonable searches and seizures.' Thus, with the support of a truism, but without any persuasive
explanation for its dismantling of Katz protection-oriented model, Terry ushered in a 'new regime."' (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9)).
51. Maclin, supra note 6, at 681.
52. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-11 (1979) (considering whether or not Terry
should apply to custodial interrogations); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (considering whether or not
Terry should be extended to protective sweeps of homes).
53. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-20, 22.
54. Id. at 20 (explaining that "on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat" should not and cannot
be subject to the warrant procedure and should instead be analyzed under the reasonableness framework).
55. Id. at 26-27 (explaining that this lowered standard is appropriate for a limited search for weapons,
though it would not be appropriate for an arrest).
56. Id. at 26 ("[The frisk] must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby ... .
57. Id. at 22-23, 26.
58. Id. at 26.
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B. The Extension of Reasonable Suspicion
The Court's shift to the reasonableness clause framework for limited
intrusions was prompted by its finding that governmental interests outweigh
those of the individual when a violent felony-an armed robbery-is about to
take place. 9 In its decision, the Court did not discuss the application of this new
standard of reasonable suspicion to misdemeanors or nonviolent crimes.6 Even
so, courts have consistently applied the Terry standard to ongoing misdemeanors,
finding that limited intrusions are per se reasonable if they are prompted by an
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion.6' Because the reasoning in Terry
suggests that the reasonable suspicion standard applies when an officer
reasonably concludes that crime is "afoot," courts have applied it to all ongoing
crimes, regardless of their classification as felonies, misdemeanors,62 or even
traffic violations.63
Before the Court's 1985 decision in Hensley, the Terry standard applied only
in cases where police stopped the person based on suspicion that the person was
about to commit, or was in the process of committing, a crime.6 In Hensley, the
Court expanded the Terry doctrine to include stops based on a reasonable
suspicion of a completed crime. 65 To arrive at its holding, the Court applied the
Terry balancing test and acknowledged that, in situations of past criminal
activity, the governmental interests are weaker than in situations of imminent,
ongoing criminal activity.6 First, the Court noted that there is no prevention
interest in completed crimes, because a crime that has already taken place can no
longer be prevented. 67 Second, exigent circumstances are not usually present
because the suspect has presumably left the scene of the crime, hidden evidence
already, and is not aware that the police are onto him.68 Third, the government no
longer has an interest in public safety when the crime is finished, because all
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7 (detailing the facts of the case and noting that the detective in Terry believed
the men were "casing a job, a stick up").
60. Id. at 29.
61. See, e.g., People v. Le Grand, 110 A.D.2d 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (Fein, J., concurring)
(applying the Terry standard to felonies and misdemeanors).
62. See id.; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ("[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot .... ).
63. California courts have applied Terry to a variety of traffic offense stops. See, e.g., Kodani v. Snyder,
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 362, 366 (Ct. App. 1999) (no seat belt); People v. Uribe, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 131 (Ct. App.
1993) (unsafe lane change); People v. Bracken, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481, 482 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2000)
(weaving within lane).
64. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985).
65. Id. at 229.
66. Id. at 228 ("The factors in the balance may be somewhat different when a stop to investigate past
criminal activity is involved rather than a stop to investigate ongoing criminal conduct.").
67. Id. ("A stop to investigate an already completed crime does not necessarily promote the interest of
crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate suspected ongoing criminal activity.").
68. Id. ("[T]he exigent circumstances which require a police officer to step in before a crime is
committed or completed are not necessarily as pressing long afterwards.").
912
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those endangered by the crime have already been affected. 69 Finally, the Court
observed that officers have more investigative options for past crimes than they
do for occurring crimes-they have more time to make decisions, more time to
talk to witnesses, and more time to investigate the scene than they do if they are
70
simply chasing someone who is in the process of committing a crime.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the governmental interests were strong
enough to prevail over the interests of the individual in certain circumstances.
The Court held that particularly "where police have been unable to locate a
person suspected of involvement in a past crime, the ability to briefly stop that
person, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause
promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders
to justice."'" While the Court found a strong governmental interest in
investigating completed crimes, it curtailed the interests of the individual by
characterizing them merely as an interest "to be free of a stop and detention that
is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or
ongoing crimes.7  Because the stop in Hensley was less extensive, the Court
found that the government's interest in the prompt resolution of crimes,
particularly felonies "involving a threat to public safety," outweighed the
interests of the individual.73
Hensley allows law enforcement to make Terry stops where they have "a
reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person
they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony. 74 However, the Court explicitly left open the question of "whether Terry
stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted. 75 In recent
years, while many circuit and state courts have decided which standard of
individualized suspicion an officer needs to investigate completed misdemeanors,
few have agreed on whether the standard should be reasonable suspicion or how
the Court should apply it.76 Yet, the common trends in these decisions, when
taken together, suggest an alternate approach to completed misdemeanors that
would simultaneously serve the interests of the government and individuals.
69. Id. ("Public safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past crime who now appears to be going
about his lawful business than it is by a suspect who is currently in the process of violating the law.").
70. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228-29 (explaining that "officers making a stop to investigate past crimes may
have a wider range of opportunity to choose the time and circumstances of the stop").
71. Id. at 229.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 15.
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HI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTENDING TERRY TO ANY
COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS
Many lower courts have held that Terry should not be applied in cases
involving completed misdemeanors." These courts advance two primary reasons
in support of their position. The first idea is that Terry does not apply because the
Supreme Court did not include completed misdemeanors in the Terry or Hensley
holdings." The second view is that the extension of Terry to such crimes is not
warranted in light of the diminished public safety concerns inherent in completed
crimes.79 However, a complete refusal to permit officers to conduct limited
searches and seizures does not adequately protect the governmental interests at
stake and it also creates difficulty when trying to apply Terry in the field.
A. Terry Should Not Be Expanded to Completed Misdemeanors Because Such
an Extension Was Not Contemplated by the Supreme Court
Some courts have taken a narrow view, holding that the exclusion of
misdemeanors from the holdings of Terry and Hensley suggests that such crimes
are not encompassed by those doctrines.' As a result, these courts have held that
using the reasonable articulable suspicion standard for completed misdemeanors
is not permissible under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." In Gaddis
v. Redford Township, the Sixth Circuit affirmatively stated that police may
"make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though
not of a mere completed misdemeanor., 82 While Gaddis gave no justification for
this rule, and announced it only in a footnote, other courts have cited it as the
Sixth Circuit's per se rule against using the Terry standard for completed
83
misdemeanors . In jurisdictions where the court has refused to extend Terry to
completed misdemeanors,8 the warrant clause remains the appropriate
77. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004); State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2nd 635,
636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
78. See Bennett, 520 So. 2d at 636 (Glickstein, J., concurring) ("The United States Supreme Court in
Hensley specifically avoided deciding whether "Terry" stops could be made to investigate crimes that were not
felonies. To date they have not decided this question.... In my judgment, stops to investigate suspects of past
misdemeanors are not permissible.").
79. State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 519 (Wash. 2002); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d
880, 881-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
80. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that the lower standard of individualized suspicion
applied in a suspected robbery, a felony); Hensley, 469 U.S. at 221, 229 (1985) (stating explicitly that it was
only deciding the issue regarding felonies).
81. See supra note 78.
82. 364 F.3d at 771 n.6.
83. Id.; see also United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Grigg,
498 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cit. 2007); United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing the
Sixth Circuit as disallowing the Terry standard for completed misdemeanors).
85. See e.g., Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004); State v. Bennett, 520 So.
2nd 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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framework of analysis for Fourth Amendment violations as they relate to those
crimes. Refusing to extend Terry to any completed misdemeanor ignores one of
the basic and often cited rationales for Terry stops-the government's interest in
crime detectionS-and places a great deal of emphasis on the mere omission of a
specific discussion of completed misdemeanors from the Terry and Hensley
decisions.86 While the Supreme Court's decision to refrain from explicitly ruling
on misdemeanor conduct (either in Terry or in Hensley) was undoubtedly
intentional, this omission is not necessarily sufficient to indicate that the Supreme
Court would adopt a per se rule proscribing Terry stops for the investigation of
completed misdemeanors.
Another practical issue is presented by this blanket prohibition on using the
Terry standard for completed misdemeanors. Because many crimes are status
offenses that may be charged as either misdemeanors or felonies depending on
the facts of each individual case, officers may not necessarily know whether the
crime they are investigating is a felony or a misdemeanor at the initiation of the
stop, let alone which classification will be charged by the District Attorney's
Office in the future.8" Essentially, officers would have to make split-second
judgments as to whether each stop will be considered justified by a court at a
later date; this would likely lead to confusion and a lack of consistency in the
field.
B. Public Interest Does Not Warrant the Extension of Terry to Completed
Misdemeanors
Other courts have held that the extension of Terry to completed
misdemeanors is unwarranted, because the balancing test that the Supreme Court
established in Terry and applied in Hensley weighs more heavily in favor of
individual rights.8 9 In Terry, the Court concluded that the governmental interests
of crime prevention, crime detection, and officer safety outweighed the
individual's interests in autonomy and privacy in public. 0 While the Court in
85. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ("One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.").
86. Id. at 6, 29-30 (Terry was decided in the felony context and the Court did not address
misdemeanors); Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (stating explicitly that the Court was only deciding the issue regarding
felonies).
87. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 (1985) ("[T]he highly technical felony/misdemeanor distinction
is equally, if not more, difficult to apply in the field.").
88. Id. ("An officer is in no position to know, for example, the precise value of property stolen, or
whether the crime was a first or second offense.").
89. E.g., State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 518 (Wash. 2002); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375
N.w.2d 880, 881, 883-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227-29; Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-
25.
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-28.
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Hensley noted that the governmental interests of crime prevention and detection
are lessened in the case of a completed crime, 9' it still found that the
governmental interests outweighed those of the individual in felony cases,92
In State v. Duncan, the Washington Supreme Court noted that "the Court's
focus on preventing crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting
felons in Hensley, suggests that the interest in preventing [lesser offenses] may
not be accorded the same weight."93 Similarly, in Blaisdell v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, the Minnesota Court of Appeals declared that "the limited benefits
to the public interest resulting from warrantless vehicle stops to investigate past
misdemeanors do not outweigh the intrusion on the 'motorists' right to free
passage without interruption." 94 Blaisdell concerned a misdemeanor "no pay" gas
theft that occurred approximately two months prior to the stop at issue in the
case.95 When the officer stopped the car, the only suspicion he had was the gas
station clerk's positive identification of the vehicle as the one involved in the
crime.96 Beyond that, the defendant driver had never been identified as the
particular person involved in the gas theft.97 In Blaisdell, the court held that stops
based upon reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor are per se
unreasonable.99 The court reasoned that the investigation of a completed
misdemeanor does not require the same kind of swift action or "on-the-spot" 99
decision-making as investigations of crimes that warrant the Terry standard.'
Terry shifted the framework of Fourth Amendment analysis for "an entire rubric
of police conduct ... which historically has not been, and as a practical matter
could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."'0 ' Specifically, the Terry stop
was created to facilitate the investigations of police officers on-the-beat, while
the Terry frisk was permitted to protect the safety of those officers.' °2 But in the
case of completed crimes, investigative decisions rarely need to be made as
swiftly as those decisions regarding ongoing crimes. Furthermore, completed
91. See supra notes 67-68.
92. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (despite the differences between ongoing and past criminal activity, the
Court still found that allowing Terry for completed felonies would "promote[] the strong government interest in
solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.").
93. 43 P.3d at 518. The court in this case considered the propriety of an officer's decision to detain three
black men for a possible civil infraction-an open container-because the men were at a public bus stop,
standing six inches from a paper bag with a bottleneck protruding from the top. Id. at 514-15.
94. Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 881, 883-84.
95. Id. at 881.
99. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 881, 883-84.
99. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. t, 20 (1968).
100. Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883-84.
101. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
102. Id. at 20, 27.
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misdemeanors are not the type of offenses that "by [their] nature would not
obviate the possession of a weapon."' 3
Implicit in the court's reasoning in Blaisdell was a perception that the
Supreme Court's application of the Terry standard to completed felonies turned
primarily on the risk to public safety-an interest that is far less pressing in cases
involving mere misdemeanors or infractions."" In other words, because
misdemeanors are "less grave" than felonies, an individual's interests in
"personal security and liberty" outweigh any interest the government may have
in bringing those misdemeanor offenders to justice absent the traditional probable
cause and warrant requirements.05 Because the Court in Terry based its holding
on a concern for the safety of officers and the prevention of a violent crime-
armed robbery-presumably, the Terry level of individualized suspicion should
only apply where officer safety and violent crimes are at issue.i 6 Since most
misdemeanors are presumably nonviolent crimes, they should not be subject to
reasonable suspicion standard allowed under Terry.'07
Restricting the Terry holding to felonies properly narrows its application to
those situations where the governmental interest is the strongest-where there is
a potential for harm to the officer to occur or for a violent crime to be
committed.'08 On the other hand, characterizing all misdemeanor offenses as non-
violent does not fully comport with the public safety rationale. For example, it
fails to take into account that violent crimes, such as assault, may nevertheless be
classified as misdemeanors in certain jurisdictions.'9 Furthermore, it fails to
recognize that certain misdemeanors that are not necessarily "violent," may
nonetheless put the public at risk of harm, such as drunk driving offenses."'
103. State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 519 (Wash. 2002).
104. Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 881, 883-84 ("[T]he limited benefits to the public interest resulting from
warrantless vehicle stops to investigate past misdemeanors do not outweigh the intrusion on the '"motorists"
right to free passage without interruption."' (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58
(1976) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)))); see also Duncan, 43 P.3d at 519 ("Accepting
the presumption that more serious crimes pose a greater risk of harm to society, we place an inversely
proportional burden in relation to the level of the violation. Thus, society will tolerate a higher level of intrusion
for a greater risk and higher crime than it would for a lesser crime.").
105. Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883 ("We must also acknowledge the disparate legislative treatment
accorded felonies and misdemeanors . . . . [Tihe public concerns served by seizures to investigate past
misdemeanors are less grave than the concerns served by seizures to investigate past felonies and gross
misdemeanors.").
106. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-27; see Duncan, 43 P.3d at 519 (acknowledging that "society will tolerate a
higher level of intrusion for a greater risk and higher crime than it would for a lesser crime" and comparing the
crime at issue, a violation of an open container law, with the crime in Terry, a potential armed robbery).
107. Duncan, 43 P.3d at 519.
108. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,
264 (1984) (emphasizing the narrowness of the Terry holding); LaFave, supra note 31, at 58.
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 2008) (defining assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another"). Assault under this code is a misdemeanor
under California law, as it is punishable by imprisonment of no more than six months. Even so, it is a violent
crime by definition. Id.
110. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West Supp. 2010) (making it unlawful to drive with a blood alcohol
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As discussed above, refusing to apply Terry to all misdemeanors ignores the
government's interest in crime detection."' While the Court in Terry maintained
that there is little or no government interest advanced by pursuing completed
crimes under a reasonableness, rather under than a traditional warrant clause
analysis, the reasonable suspicion standard may in fact serve the government's
important interest in crime detection, particularly where there is a propensity for
ongoing or repeated danger." 2 The government's interest in detecting crime and
bringing offenders to justice, although lowered, may still be present in
misdemeanor cases," 3 especially in the case of violent misdemeanors, such as
battery or spousal abuse."
4
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING TERRY TO ALL COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS
Another option for the Court would be to extend Terry to all completed
misdemeanors. Under this approach, the Court would have two options: it could
declare a per se rule extending Terry to all completed misdemeanor crimes, or it
could balance the particular interests involved and determine the reasonableness
of each completed misdemeanor stop on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately,
neither provides proper protection for individual rights. While the former method
simply does not place enough importance on the rights of the individual; the
latter method does not adequately deter officers from making the stop first and
justifying it later.
A. A Per Se Extension of Terry
At least one court has extended the per se rules of Terry and Hensley to
completed misdemeanors, without issue."5 In Terry, the Court held that limited
searches and seizures are per se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if an
officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime is being committed."6
Because the Court in Terry was concerned with the practical implications of its
content of .08% or more); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23536 (West Supp. 2010 (declaring that violations of Cal. Veh.
Code § 23152 "shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 96 hours..., meaning
that it is not a felony offense); United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (giving the example
of drunken or reckless driving as a misdemeanor crime with the potential for repeated or ongoing danger).
111. See supra Part IM.A.
112. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
113. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
114. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
115. State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ("A Louisiana law enforcement officer
may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects has committed an offense and may demand
from him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. Offense is defined to include a felony or a
misdemeanor.").
116. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21,30(1968).
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holding for officers working "on-the-beat," it announced a per se rule which
would presumably be easier to apply in the field."7
Extending the Terry holding to all completed misdemeanors would serve its
traditional objectives and give officers a concrete rule to apply in their daily
duties on the job. A court using this approach would most likely determine that
the governmental interests outweigh the interests of the individual, regardless of
whether the crime is classified as either a misdemeanor or felony. "' In Hensley,
for instance, the Court gave very little deference to the interests of the individual
and found that there was a strong governmental interest, even after
acknowledging that the government's interest may be lessened in the case of
completed crimes."9
While an extension of Terry to all completed misdemeanors would be easy to
apply in the field, it would also perpetuate the further diminution of individual
rights-a result not necessarily contemplated by the Court's narrow holding in
Terry.20 The Terry reasonableness framework was predicated on the idea that it
would be impractical for an investigating officer to obtain a warrant for a crime
being committed "on-the-beat."1 2' Allowing officers to circumvent the warrant
process for every potential misdemeanor that has already been completed confers
entirely too much deference to the government interest and does not do nearly
enough to protect individual rights. 2 2 In Terry, the Court noted that even a brief
detention was a severe intrusion upon a person's liberty-an intrusion that the
Court justified in the context of a violent, ongoing crime.22 A per se application
of Terry to all crimes, no matter how insignificant, virtually ignores this
117. Id. at 20 ("[Wle deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as
a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.").
118. See, e.g., Myers, 490 So.2d at 703-04 (noting that while the balancing test employed in Terry and
Hensley "balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," a police officer may nevertheless conduct a limited
search or seizure of an individual who "he reasonably suspects has committed an offense," without regard to
whether that offense is defined as a felony or a misdemeanor).
119. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985).
120. Wasserstrom, supra note 108, at 264 ("Clearly, the Terry Court would not have approved of the
extensive balancing that now goes on in its name. Nor would it have struck the balance so consistently in favor
of law enforcement interests, for the Court in Terry emphasized both the 'narrowness' of the question it was
deciding, and the 'narrowly drawn authority' of the police to search or seize without a warrant or probable
cause.").
121. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
122. See Wasserstrom, supra note 108, at 264 (noting that the Court in Terry was hesitant to afford too
much deference to the interests of law enforcement).
123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 ("[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public
by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty
indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.").
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concern.'" By placing so little importance on individual rights, this approach
does not appropriately address its potential consequences.
B. The Balancing Act
Another possible approach the Court could pursue would be to apply the
totality of the circumstances balancing test announced in Terry, and reapplied in
Hensley, to each individual type of crime being investigated.'25 This would allow
the court to balance the competing interests of the government and the individual
as required by the particular aspects of each type of crime. 26 In the last several
years, three circuit courts and one district court have advocated for this balancing
approach, using extremely fact-specific reasons to justify either the application or
non-application of Terry.
27
In United States. v. Moran, the Tenth Circuit found that the stop of the
defendant was reasonable where the nature of the stop was brief and non-
intrusive, and there was a high potential that the defendant was armed.'20 Moran
involved the suspicion of a completed misdemeanor of criminal trespass. 29 The
court's analysis considered, among other things, the location of the property, the
fact that it was hunting season, the fact that the defendant had experienced past
altercations with the property owner, and the fact that the defendant had
trespassed on the property before. 3° The court held that the Terry standard of
reasonable suspicion was the appropriate level of individualized suspicion
required to stop the defendant's car."' The court stressed that its holding was
based purely on the balancing test, reasoning that the potential for an altercation,
and the potential that the defendant was armed weighed heavily in favor of the
governmental interest.3 2 The court in Moran limited its holding to the specific
facts of the case, emphasizing the "limited and fact-dependent nature" of its
holding. 
33
124. Id.
125. For examples of cases that have used this approach to resolve issues in their respective
jurisdictions, see, e.g., United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jegede, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 704 (D. Md. 2003).
126. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 23-28 (1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29
(1985).
127. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081 ("[W]e decline to adopt a per se standard that police may not conduct a
Terry stop to investigate a person in connection with a past completed misdemeanor simply because of the
formal classification of the offense. We think it depends on the nature of the misdemeanor."); Hughes, 517 F.3d
at 1018; Jegede, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 707-08; Moran, 503 F.3d at 1141-43.
128. Moran, 503 F.3d at 1143.
129. Id. at 1138-39.
130. Id. at 1143.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. ("We do not suggest that all investigatory stops based on completed misdemeanors are
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In another criminal trespass case, United States v. Hughes, the Eighth Circuit
found, based on the particular facts of the case, that the governmental interest did
not outweigh the individual's interest. In that case, the defendant was not acting
suspiciously, there was no report of a crime, and nothing in the dispatch of the
call indicated a dangerous situation.' 35 The court found that public safety was of
primary importance in the balancing test. 136 Since there was no pressing public
safety issue, no important government interest in apprehending this particular
defendant, and no government interest in investigating this particular crime, the
individual's interests outweighed those of the government." 7 Thus, the court held
that the lowered level of reasonable suspicion was inappropriate and unwarranted
where there was no indication of danger.38
The Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Grigg was another case in which
the court, after applying the fact-specific balancing test, decided not to extend the
Terry standard to the investigation of a completed misdemeanor.' 39 In Grigg, the
court held that the stop was unreasonable because the misdemeanor in question-
a local noise ordinance violation-was completely harmless.140 The court
reasoned that the important factors to be weighed were less fact-specific and
more general-the potential harm to others and the possibility that the police may
have alternative means to achieve the investigative purpose. "4' Under this
analysis, the court evaluated the legitimacy of the governmental interests before
even looking to the privacy interests of the individual.
42
Seemingly, this balancing act promotes the fair administration of justice
because it focuses on the facts and the interests involved in each individual case.
To determine the appropriate level of individualized suspicion under this
approach, individual officers are required to assess whether the government's
interests outweigh the interests of the person being stopped. However, while
academically intriguing, this approach is limiting and could prove difficult in
practice. First, as demonstrated by the cases above, this fact-specific, case-by-
reasonable or even that any stop based on a completed criminal trespass is per se reasonable.").
134. 517 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008).
135. Id. (holding that the mere risk of confrontation with a property owner, standing alone, was not
enough to outweigh the defendant's interest).
136. Id. at 1017.
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Id. (holding that the mere risk of confrontation with a property owner, standing alone, was not
enough to outweigh the defendant's interest).
139. 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007).
140. Id. at 1077 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a less threatening offense than playing one's car stereo at an
excessive volume. The absence of any danger to any person arising from the misdemeanor noise violation here
does not support detaining the suspect as promptly as possible.").
141. Id. at 1081 ("An assessment of the 'public safety' factor should be considered within the totality of
the circumstances, when balancing the privacy interests at stake against the efficacy of a Terry stop, along with
the possibility that the police may have alternative means to identify the suspect or achieve the investigative
purpose of the stop.").
142. Id.
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case balancing inquiry lacks consistency, because it relies on an individual
officer to make a subjective judgment of the situation at hand.' 43 Second, since
this approach only affords retroactive protection of Fourth Amendment interests
and circumvents judicial oversight, it could easily give rise to abuse of discretion
by officers, in turn resulting in public distrust of the system.'
4
It is entirely foreseeable that an officer would value the government's interest
as more important than the interests of a potential defendant. But the Court in
Terry did not intend for the rights of individuals to be relegated to the prejudices
of officers; in fact, the Court was very clear that the rights of individuals were not
to be ignored. 45 An officer-conducted balancing test would leave the individual
to simply wait and hope that a court would disagree with the officer's judgment
and come to a correct determination of their case years after the initial intrusion.
It is possible that without the judicial oversight provided by the warrant process,
officers would be allowed far too much discretion to interfere with individual
rights. Officers will simply act first and justify their actions later, rather than
having to explain the reasons for their actions to a judge beforehand. A per se
rule about Terry's application would inform officers of what level of
individualized suspicion is needed before the stop-rather than assuming that the
government's interest outweighs the interest of the particular individual and
requiring justification after the stop.
Further, this balancing test approach would not be practical for on-the-beat
policing-the context in which Terry was decided.'" This approach lacks proper
guiding principles to aid officers in the field, because officers would have no way
of knowing the proper level of individualized suspicion before they decide
whether or not to stop an individual. 47 Officers need a rule that can be easily
applied in their daily duties-and preferably, it should be a rule that is not subject
to the whims or prejudices of particular officers. 48 Even if officers could
consistently and knowledgeably apply this balancing test, such balancing is a job
for the court, not for individual officers. "41 When it comes time for the Supreme
143. See supra note 125.
144. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics,
and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 265-73 (1999) ("Pretextual traffic
stops aggravate years of accumulated feelings of injustice, resulting in deepening distrust and cynicism by
African-Americans about police and the entire criminal justice system.").
145. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (noting that even a brief search or seizure is a severe "intrusion upon
cherished personal security, . . . it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience").
146. See supra note 121.
147. In both Terry and Hensley, the Court consciously articulated per se rules for the application of
reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,229 (1985).
148. See Harris, supra note 144 (noting the potential for officers to target certain minorities in their
investigations).
149. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
922
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Court to take up the issue of whether or not the Terry standard of reasonable
suspicion should be applied to cases involving completed misdemeanors, it
should do as it did in Terry and Hensley-announce a per se rule that is practical
for use by officers in the field.5
V. A MIXED APPROACH-EXTENDING TERRY TO SOME COMPLETED
MISDEMEANORS
A final approach to the completed misdemeanor dilemma is a mixed
method--one that allows for the proper consideration of both the interests of the
government and the interests of the individual. This approach would extend the
Terry reasonable suspicion standard to those completed misdemeanor offenses
implicating public safety, setting clear-cut guidelines for those situations where
the governmental interest is at its strongest. While this approach is a novel one, it
is supported by the reasoning of Terry and Hensley and the rulings of several
lower courts.'"' Furthermore, an adequate definition of "public safety" can be
easily fleshed out through the analogical reasoning of the Court's decisions in
other areas of criminal justice.'52
A. Providing Adequate Protection for the Government's Interest in Public
Safety
Upon consideration of all suggested approaches, the Supreme Court should
adopt a standard that extends the Terry reasonable articulable suspicion standard
to all police stops where a completed misdemeanor posing an ongoing threat to
public safety is suspected. The balancing test enunciated in Terry justifies such
an intrusion on individual interests by according substantial weight to the
potential threat to the safety of others or the officer.5 3 In subsequent decisions,
courts have consistently held that public safety is an important consideration in
the Terry balancing test, and it justifies the use of reasonable suspicion for
limited intrusions. 154
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances.").
150. Id. at 30; Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229.
151. See Hensley, 469 U.S. 221; Terry, 392 U.S. 1; United States v. Grigg, 298 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jegede, 294 F. Supp. 2d 704
(D. Md. 2003) (focusing on the safety of the public and officers involved to determine whether or not the
intrusion upon individual rights was warranted).
152. See supra note 151.
153. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 ("[The stop] must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.").
154. Id. at 24 ("[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest.").
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The court in Grigg explained that the danger inherent in felonies makes them
categorically different from misdemeanors, but if a misdemeanor also presents a
threat to public safety, then an officer should be able to stop and investigate.' 5
Similarly, in Hughes, the court held that public safety was an important factor in
the Terry balancing test. 56 Further, in United States v. Jegede, a Maryland
District Court noted that "[p]ublic safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a
past crime who now appears to be going about his lawful business than it is by a
suspect who is currently in the process of violating the law."'
5 7
Essentially, past crimes contain no exigent circumstances, and absent a
propensity for ongoing danger, the government's interest is simply not strong
enough to justify the violation of the individual's privacy and autonomy interests
absent probable cause and a warrant or warrant exception.'58 The court's focus on
the nature of the misdemeanor in Grigg seeks to inform the weight of the
governmental interest." 9 Essentially, the court in Grigg reasoned that the
governmental interest of solving crime and bringing offenders to justice is
lessened when those crimes and those offenders pose little, if any, threat to
society. "6 Under this reasoning, individual rights should only be impeded where
there is potential for harm to officers or to members of the public, because the
government's interest is strongest when it involves protecting public safety.'6'
Conversely, where there is no threat to public safety in the context of a
completed misdemeanor, the Court "should tend to give primary weight to a
suspect's interest in personal security . . . considering the law enforcement's
interest in the immediate detention of a suspect is not paramount.' ' 62 That is not
to say that the government has no interest in bringing these offenders to justice-
just that its interest is not strong enough to warrant a lower level of
155. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
156. Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1017.
157. Jegede, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
158. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1080.
159. Id. at 1080-81 (reasoning that any threat to public safety is of paramount concern when assessing
the weight of the governmental interests).
160. Id.
161. See Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Grigg and Moran in support of its
determination that public safety was a critical factor); United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir.
2007) ("[The governmental] interest is particularly strong when the criminal activity involves a threat to public
safety."); Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he absence of a public safety risk reasonably inferred
from an innocuous past misdemeanor suggests the primacy of a suspect's Fourth Amendment interest in
personal security."); Jegede, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 708 ("Public safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past
crime who now appears to be going about his lawful business than it is by a suspect who is currently in the
process of violating the law."); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub.Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
("[Plublic concerns served by seizures to investigate past misdemeanors are less grave than the concerns served
by seizures to investigate past felonies and gross misdemeanors."); State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct.
App. 1986) ("The safety of the motoring public and the potential capacity of the automobile to inflict serious
damage provides a fairly strong government interest."); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 515, 521 (Wash. 2002) ("The
policy concerns for police safety are in tension with the constitutional guarantees of personal privacy.").
162. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1080.
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individualized suspicion and the absence of judicial oversight.' 63 Accordingly,
under this approach, stops for completed misdemeanors that do not implicate
public safety would continue to be analyzed under the framework of the warrant
clause, rather than that of the reasonableness clause, thus requiring the higher
level of probable cause and a warrant or warrant exception to justify an officer's
search or seizure of an individual or property.164
B. Overcoming Concern Regarding the Practical Application of a Balancing
Test
While the court in Grigg purported to use a fact-specific balancing test, the
reasoning of the case seems to support an analysis based on public safety
165
concerns:
We adopt the rule that a reviewing court must consider the nature of the
misdemeanor offense in question, with particular attention to the
potential for ongoing or repeated danger (e.g., drunken and/or reckless
driving), and any risk of escalation (e.g., disorderly conduct, assault,
domestic violence). An assessment of the "public safety" factor should
be considered within the totality of the circumstances, when balancing
the privacy interests at stake against the efficacy of a Terry stop, along
with the possibility that the police may have alternative means to identify
the suspect or achieve the investigative purpose of the stop.'66
While this is still balancing in some sense, it is focused on more concrete
factors, such as the potential for ongoing or repeated danger and any risk of
escalation.' 67 This approach will increase consistency in the application of the
Terry standard by the courts, because the courts can fit the facts of each case into
this public-safety-specific framework. This approach also lessens the amount of
discretion that individual officers in the field can exercise, because certain crimes
necessarily implicate public safety. 168 By limiting officer discretion, the possible
abuses of that discretion are also lessened.'69
163. See supra note 161 (where there is no threat to public safety, the government's interest is inherently
lower).
164. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("We do not retreat from our holdings that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by
exigent circumstances.").
165. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 2008) (including the word "violent" in the definition of assault,
a misdemeanor under California law).
169. See Harris, supra note 144 (describing some of the potential adverse consequences of deferring to
an officer's judgment).
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C. Applying the Mixed Approach
In brief, the Terry standard should only apply to completed misdemeanors
where the crime in question implicates public safety. In applying this rule, the
court should weigh the public safety factors described in Grigg-the potential for
ongoing or repeated danger, the risk of escalation, and whether or not the police
have an alternate means of achieving the purpose of the stop. 70
This approach effectively deals with the misdemeanor versus felony
distinction, because the actual classification of the crime is less important.
Because many crimes are "wobblers," meaning they can be charged either as a
felony or a misdemeanor,7 ' focusing on the immediate public safety implications
rather than the statutory classification provides a clearer standard for the
application of Terry.
Furthermore, this proposed rule is amply supported by current case law.
Despite their differing approaches to the facts of each particular case, seven of
the nine state and circuit court cases discussed in this Comment considered
public safety in at least some fashion'---and although these courts used the
public safety factor in different ways and accorded it different weight,171 the
majority of the cases that applied Terry to completed misdemeanors mentioned it
nonetheless. 74 Clearly, courts are finding that public safety should play at least
some part in Fourth Amendment analysis,'75 and this proposed approach is
consistent with that trend.
D. Defining What Qualifies as "Public Safety"
The shortcoming of the "public safety" approach is that it lacks clarity
regarding what exactly qualifies as "public safety" and what types of conduct can
be, or should be, considered a "threat" to it. Grigg identified several
misdemeanor offenses it considered to be under the umbrella of a "threat to
public safety," namely drunken or reckless driving, disorderly conduct, assault,
and domestic violence. 176 Each of these crimes involves a risk of harm to another
person and therefore implicates public safety. For some crimes, officers will
170. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
171. NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 5 (3d ed.
2008).
172. See supra note 161.
173. Compare Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081 (using public safety as a paramount factor in the consideration of
whether Terry should apply), with State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (referencing public
safety seemingly as an afterthought with concerns only expressed in dicta after the court decided to extend
Terry to completed misdemeanors).
174. See supra note 161.
175. See supra note 161.
176. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
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know whether or not public safety is implicated by the very definition of the
offense. 177
However, some crimes do not clearly implicate public safety, such as
criminal trespass-an offense over which courts have split in regards to the
public safety issue. 17' For crimes that are not violent or dangerous by their very
definitions, the Court should issue guidelines that would allow officers to use the
Terry standard when investigating a crime that has the potential to implicate
public safety. Some of the considerations of the "public safety" factor advanced
by lower courts include: the potential capacity of the infliction of serious
damage,'79 ongoing or repeated danger, and a risk of escalation. s0 Where a crime
is not specified as a violent crime, or as a non-violent crime implicating public
safety (such as drunk driving), officers would be allowed to use the above-
mentioned factors to determine whether the extension of Terry to public safety
misdemeanors covers the crime being investigated.
V. CONCLUSION
The Terry case ushered in an era of rulings that diminished the value of
individual rights and gave great deference to the government by allowing officers
to use a standard of individualized suspicion "less than probable cause"'8 ' in
justifying an investigative stop of a person.8 2 In the forty years since the Supreme
Court decided Terry, other courts have applied the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard in several contexts extraneous to Terry's initial holding.' 83
When the Supreme Court takes up the issue of whether or not Terry should be
applied to cases involving completed misdemeanors, it should rule that the
reasonable suspicion standard is only applicable to those completed
misdemeanors that implicate the governmental interests set forth in Terry'4 and
expanded on in the decades since. In other words, the Supreme Court should only
177. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 2008) (defining assault as a violent crime).
178. Compare United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that Terry should
be the applicable standard and that, under Terry, the stop was reasonable, because it was hunting season, the
trespassing occurred on a property near a forest, the crime had occurred just moments prior to the stop, and the
property owner had many altercations with the defendant in the past), with United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d
1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that where nothing in the dispatch indicated that the trespasser was
dangerous and there was no threat to public safety, a Terry stop was not justified to investigate the completed
crime).
179. State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
180. Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
181. Myers, 490 So.2d at 702 ("Reasonable cause for an investigatory stop is something less than
probable cause.").
182. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Maclin, supra note 6, at 676.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) (holding that Terry applies to
completed felonies); People v. Le Grand, 110 A.D.2d 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that Terry applies to
felonies and misdemeanors).
184. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24 (citing crime prevention and detection and officer safety as important
governmental interests).
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extend the Terry standard to cover those completed misdemeanors involving a
risk to public safety and a need for the officer make an "on-the-spot" decision of
whether or not to investigate further.' 5
To facilitate this balancing of rights, the Court could announce a rule
detailing specifically those misdemeanor crimes, or more generally, the type of
misdemeanor crimes intended to be covered by the holding, or it could choose to
keep completed misdemeanors under the purview of the warrant clause analysis.
In fashioning its rule, the Court could rely on the factors relating to public safety
articulated in Grigg to determine whether the particular misdemeanor warrants
the lowered standard.
186
This rule would simultaneously protect both the interests of the government
and those of the individual. Because potential harm to officers or the public often
raises governmental interests above individual rights,' 7 the public safety context
should be the only context in which the Court extends the Terry standard to allow
any further reduction in the protection of individual rights.
185. See supra note 117.
186. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 161.
